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Abstract 
For Aristotle, the happy life is the highest human good. But could even unhappy human lives have a 
grain of intrinsic goodness? Aristotle’s views about the value of the “mere living,” in contrast to the 
good living, have been neglected in the scholarship, in spite of his recurrent preoccupation with this 
question. Offering a close reading of a passage from Nicomachean Ethics IX.9, I argue that, for Ar-
istotle, all human lives are intrinsically good by virtue of fully satisfying the definition, and thus 
function, of their biological species. On the one hand, this rudimentary goodness is independent of 
whether the life is lived well or badly; on the other hand, it is ultimately outweighed by the badness 









In the ninth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle argues that the virtuous person “wishes to live 
and to be preserved,” and rightly so, because “existing is something good to the good person [ἀγαθὸν 
τῷ σπουδαίῳ τὸ εἶναι];”1 elsewhere in the same book, he notes that “living is choiceworthy [αἱρετὸν 
τὸ ζῆν], and for the good person most of all [μάλιστα], since being is good and pleasant for him.”2 
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These two claims are broadly in agreement, but there is a subtle difference.3 Whereas the first sug-
gests that living is good to the good person exclusively, the second implies that life might be worth 
choosing, albeit to a lesser degree than for the good, even for those who fall short of virtue. If even 
non-virtuous lives could be worth choosing to some degree, this worth would have to be conferred 
by something other than virtue, presumably by the value of “mere living” (ζῆν μόνον), in contrast to 
the value of “good living” (εὖ ζῆν).4 But does Aristotle think that the mere living has any intrinsic 
worth when it falls short of happiness, or even when it is vicious? Although the recent years have 
seen an increased interest in the relationship and intersections between Aristotle’s ethics and science, 
including his biology,5 very little has been said about the mere biological living, as distinct from the 
good living, from the ethical point of view.6 The objective of this article is to make a step towards 
filling this gap.  
 I attempt to do this by way of a close reading of a difficult passage in the Nicomachean Ethics 
IX.9, where Aristotle seeks to establish a premise for one of his arguments that a virtuous person 
needs friends. He announces here explicitly that he will tackle a problem in ethical theory from a 
“more natural point of view” (φυσικώτερον).7 Whereas the argument itself, as well as its sister ver-
sion in the Eudemian Ethics VII.12, have been discussed in the recent scholarship,8 the premise itself 
has received little attention. And yet it contains what is arguably the most concentrated take on the 
question of the value of human life in the entire Aristotelian corpus. “Living is of the things that are 
good and pleasant by themselves [τὸ δὲ ζῆν τῶν καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων],” Aristotle says, “be-
cause it is definite [ὡρισμενον γάρ], and the definite is of the nature of the good [τῆς τἀγαθοῦ 
φύσεως].”9 Hereafter he appends an important qualification (the ‘Qualification’): when we say that 
life is good, “we should not take” (οὐ δεῖ λαμβάνειν) lives that are vicious, corrupted or painful, since 
these lives are “indefinite” (ἀόριστος).10  
 Commentators have regarded this goodness-of-life claim (GoL claim) and its justification by 
reference to “definiteness” as obscure and have given it relatively little attention. The established 
reading of the GoL claim could be called a “restrictive” reading, insofar as it makes the inherent 
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goodness of being alive restricted by the degree of goodness that a life has by virtue of being lived 
well.11 What speaks in favor of this reading are Aristotle’s pessimistic claims about the value of un-
perfected human lives. In Eudemian Ethics I.5 Aristotle notes that pains, misfortunes or vice are 
enough to “make not existing at all superior to being alive” (ὥστε το μὴ εἶναι κρεῖττον εἶναι τοῦ 
ζῆν).12 In Politics I.2, we read that an unjust human life is not only not good, but that it is the worst, 
when compared to that of other animals.13 But there are also more fundamental logical and metaphys-
ical reasons for the restrictive reading that have to do with Aristotle’s decisively teleological account 
of existence. Things exist, or live,14 to the extent that they have a specific form or essence; this es-
sence is defined by a specific function (ἔργον) or end (τέλος) by virtue of which these things are good 
of their kind; so, humans are alive, properly speaking, to the extent that they achieve their human end, 
which is to live a flourishing life. If a life is half-virtuous, then it is half-good; if it is vicious, then it 
is void of any intrinsic goodness. So, the reason that the GoL claim applies only to the good lives is 
that unhappy lives do not, strictly considered, qualify as lives in the full sense. This account is also 
strongly suggested by the Qualification. Aristotle says that life is good because it is inherently some-
thing “definite”; the reason that unhappy lives are “indefinite” is precisely that these lives fall short 
of the human end, and are thus called lives only in an incomplete sense. It is the implicit corollary of 
this view that, to the extent that the humans who live these unhappy lives fall short of the human end, 
they fail to be humans in the proper sense, since human end defines the human essence. 
 I defend an alternative to the restrictive reading, which I call a “concessive” reading, in the 
sense that it concedes a share of intrinsic value even to some unperfected lives, and quite inde-
pendently of whether they are lived well or badly. The concessive reading takes support from several 
claims in Aristotelian corpus which seem to attribute some intrinsic value to the mere living alone. I 
argue that these claims do not clash with the teleological ethics and ontology because Aristotle im-
plicitly operates with two distinct levels of finality that can be called a “rudimentary” and an “ad-
vanced” finality. The rudimentary finality is a finality in a strictly natural or biological sense; in 
reference to the human species, it is an intermediate teleological state between the overwhelming lack 
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of perfection in case of the human brutes, and the complete perfection of flourishing human beings.  
The flourishing life reaches the advanced finality; this finality is achieved when the human nature is 
further perfected by habituation and the art of politics. To achieve the rudimentary finality, it is suf-
ficient to exercise those capacities in the human soul that define the human essence; it is not necessary 
to exercise them well. A life that achieves the rudimentary finality deserves to be called a human life 
in the full sense, and, insofar as living as a way of being depends on living qua definite essence, those 
who are “merely” alive are alive in the full sense of that word. That living a life which deserves to be 
called human is good does not mean that every human life is worth choosing, all things considered. 
But, insofar as finality confers goodness, it does mean that every human life has a grain of intrinsic 
goodness that makes it superior to the lives of monsters or human brutes. Unlike these lives, every 
human life is good because it fits a definite box in the natural teleology.15 
 Thus, the attempt to clarify what Aristotle thought about the value of unperfected human lives 
is bound to imply a broader methodological reflection on how the biological and ethical domains of 
Aristotle’s thought—and especially the normative dimensions of each of them—are interlocked. One 
of the passages I shall quote below to support the concessive reading comes from the Politics, and it 
is this treatise that is perhaps most informative about the relationship between the biological and 
ethical normative domains, or between the value of “mere living” and “living well”. These values can 
be weighed against each other, they are not cashed out in two incommensurable currencies; living 
well is much better than the mere living. But even the mere living alone is a self-contained end of the 
city, which can be achieved prior and independently of another city’s end, namely to live well.16 I 
shall refine this preliminary sketch of the relationship between biological and ethical domains in the 
conclusion.   
 I start from an interpretation of Aristotle’s claim that definiteness is “of the nature of the good” 
(Part One). The justification of this claim derives from the fact that both definiteness and goodness 
are teleological notions. Next I discuss why Aristotle says that living is something definite but im-
perfect lives are indefinite (Part Two). In this section the grounds for the restrictive reading are spelled 
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out: painful and vicious lives are indefinite because they fall short of the human end. The remaining 
part of the article defends the concessive reading, starting from a review of the textual evidence in 
favor of the view that the mere living has some excellence-independent finality and goodness (Part 
Three). The next two sections reconstruct the philosophical justification for this view. One important 
consideration is Aristotle’s definition of the human life in the immediate context of our passage: one 
is alive qua human, insofar as one perceives or thinks (Part Four). Neither pain nor vice frustrate 
these vital activities, and so even imperfect human lives have some degree of definiteness. Hence the 
Qualification itself needs to be qualified: imperfect lives are half-indefinite and half-definite because 
they fall short of the complete finality but achieve the rudimentary finality. This reading can be further 
supported by Aristotle’s account of the human function from the first book of Nicomachean Ethics 
(Part Five). This account implies that there is a gap between exercising the human function and 
achieving the human end, insofar as it is possible to exercise the human function badly. The “mere” 
exercise of the human function corresponds to the rudimentary finality, whereas the good exercise to 
the advanced finality. Finally, I turn to the question whether the rudimentary goodness of human life 
can have any practical relevance (Part Six). I suggest in what sense can the mere living be good for 
the one who chooses it, and how much this goodness weights in comparison with badness that the 
life has on account of being lived badly. I conclude by spelling out the implications of this interpre-
tation for the understanding of the relationship between the biological and the ethical discourse in 
Aristotle’s philosophy.  
 Before I start, a terminological note is in order. There are two different Greek terms that cor-
respond to the English “life” and both play an important role in Aristotle’s thought: ζωή and βίος. 
Whereas these terms can be used interchangeably in some contexts of Aristotle’s thought, in other 
contexts, for instance in the discussion of contemplative or political “life”, Aristotle  consistently opts 
for βίος but not ζωή. This likely reflects a difference in meaning of these words in general Greek, 
where βίος tends to refer to a narrated and characteristically human life, whereas ζωή to merely bio-
logical life. Indeed, there is an influential view going back to Hannah Arendt that the distinction 
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between these two terms plays a decisive role in Aristotle’s political theory, where life in the sense 
of βίος refers to the distinctively human life consisting of words, deeds and actions, as opposed to the 
mere biological living in the sense of ζωή. This raises the question whether the difference between 
βίος and ζωή plays a role in the present discussion of the value of mere living, in contrast to the value 
of good living. I do not think it does. The most important reason is that, properly speaking, the term 
most relevant for our discussion is neither βίος nor ζωή but the verb ζῆν, to live.17 This verb has no 
greater affinity to ζωή than it has βίος; it is quite normal for Aristotle to say, for instance, that semens 
and fetations “live [ζῆν] the life [βίος] of a plant”,18 which also demonstrates that there is nothing 
distinctively human about the term βίος.19  
 
 
1. Why “definiteness” entails goodness?  
 
One of the questions that concerns Aristotle in his discussion of friendship in Nicomachean Ethics 
IX is whether the good person needs friends. On the whole, Aristotle argues, the good person will 
indeed need friends, otherwise his life would be lacking in an important respect. After claiming that 
friends are worth having for the good person because they augment her opportunities for “observing 
decent actions” and make her own vital activity more “continuous”, he examines the question again 
“from the point of view of nature”. The whole argument has the grammatical form of a conditional 
sentence, the apodosis of which runs as follows: 
 
...then just as for each his own existence is worth choosing [τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι αἱρετόν ἐστιν 
ἑκάστῳ], so his friend’s is too, or to a similar degree. But as we saw, the good man’s existence 
is worth choosing because of his perceiving himself, that self being good; and such perceiving 
is pleasant in itself. In that case, he needs to be concurrently perceiving the friend–that he 
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exists, too–and this will come about in their living together, conversing, and sharing their talk 
and thoughts. (EN IX.9, 1170b8-13) 
 
The idea that “for each his own existence is worth choosing” is formulated explicitly in the protasis 
of this sentence: “But if being alive is good and pleasant, and it seems to be, also from the fact that 
everybody desires it [ἐκ τοῦ πάντας ὀρέγεσθαι αὐτοῦ], and decent and blessed people most of all, 
since for them life is most worth choosing [αἱρετώτατος], and their vital activity is most blessed… .”20 
The most general term Aristotle uses to characterize the value of life is “worth choosing” (αἱρετόν). 
The continuation of the passage specifies that there are two attributes of life that make it worth choos-
ing: goodness and pleasure. In the following interpretation, I concentrate on goodness rather than on 
pleasure, but since Aristotle consistently mentions the two side by side, a brief note on their relation-
ship is in order.  
 As Aristotle makes clear in Nicomachean Ethics X.5, the value of pleasure depends on the 
value of the activity on which it “supervenes”: pleasures in good activities are good, pleasures in bad 
activities are bad.21 So the choiceworthiness of life on account of pleasure will ultimately derive from 
its choiceworthiness on account of goodness. But even the very fact that living is intrinsically pleasant 
seems to derive from its being intrinsically good. The reason why living is good is that it is something 
“definite”. This notion of definiteness, again, seems to be closely linked with another characteristic 
attribute of life, namely its naturalness; a few lines later, we read that “being alive is something nat-
urally good” (φύσει γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ζωή).22 We know from Aristotle’s theory of pleasure that pleasure is 
an unimpeded activity of a “natural state”.23 So the reason why living is intrinsically pleasant is, 
presumably, that it is something natural, which, as we shall be able to confirm shortly, also means 
that it is something definite, and hence good. 
 In the remaining part of this section, I reconstruct the steps needed to justify why definiteness 
confers intrinsic value: (i) “definiteness” is logically and metaphysically linked with “essence” and 
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“form”; (ii) essence and form are defined by reference to “function” and “end”; (iii) function and end 
are closely associated with the “fine” and the “good”.  
 (i) The association of the “definite” or “determinate” (ὡρισμενον) with goodness is an older 
Pythagorean and Platonic idea, which Aristotle repeatedly refers to and endorses.24 It appears in a 
variety of philosophical contexts, including biological, physical and political treatises, and has its 
foundation in logic and metaphysics. In Plato’s Philebus, the characteristic feature of being “definite” 
is not to allow for more or less, as do the predicates ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ or ‘quick’ and ‘slow’, but to have 
a clearly defined, discrete form, such as the ‘equal’ or the ‘double’.25 Aristotle follows this view 
insofar as he ties the form or essence of a thing, namely “what it is” (τὸ τί ἐστι) for a thing to be, to 
its “definition”.26 Being defined (ὡρισμενον), or having a definition (ὁρισμός), is thus not only one 
of the many attributes of existing things; it constitutes their very being: for an x to be means for an x 
to be defined or definite, namely to have a specific essence or form of an x. The essential link between 
being and having a definition is brought out by the fact that its opposite, being “without definition” 
(ἀόριστον), is a privative notion, falling short of being, failing to have an essence.27  
 In the context of metaphysics and natural philosophy, having a definition comes to mean that 
matter becomes defined by form, insofar as form actualizes some of the potentialities, rather than 
other, in the matter.28 Even though “the ordered and the definite (τὸ ὡρισμένον) is far more apparent 
in the heaven” than in our sublunary sphere,29 since the matter that constitutes the heavenly bodies is 
fully controlled by the form and is therefore free from chance and disorder, works of nature, similarly 
to the works of crafts, are, for the most part, also definite. If there is to exist a definite thing, a house 
or a man, the craftsman or nature must “define” or “limit” the matter in a precise and non-arbitrary 
manner so that it acquires the specific form of that thing. The notion of definiteness is thus closely 
associated with necessity and, in the specific case of generative processes in the sublunary sphere, 
with a hypothetical necessity.30 In contrast to the heavenly realm of divine and eternal entities, which 
are governed by unconditional necessity, some natural processes fail to reach their “limit and end” 
(ὅρον καὶ τέλος), as evident from cases of freaks or other defective births, such as a man-headed 
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calf.31 These are cases when the “formal nature has not mastered the material nature,”32 or, as we 
might put it, when the form has failed to fully define the underlying matter. These indeterminate 
entities are, as we would expect, not only biologically defective but also logically undefined. We can 
only grasp what a man-headed calf is approximately and indirectly by referring to how it falls short 
of the related definite essences, that is, that of a calf and that of a man. 
 (ii) The above phrase “limit and end” points to the characteristic aspect of Aristotle’s account 
of form or essence, namely that it is defined by “that for the sake of which” (οὗ ἕνεκα), that is, its 
“end” (τέλος) or “function” (ἔργον): “All things are defined by their function [ἅπαντα δ᾿ ἐστὶν 
ὡρισμένα τῷ ἔργῳ], and the true being of each consists in its ability to perform its particular function 
[τὰ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμενα ποιεῖν τὸ αὑτῶν ἔργον ἀληθῶς ἐστιν ἕκαστον]; of the eye, for instance, its 
ability to see, while if it cannot perform its function it is that thing in name only, like a dead man or 
a stone figure of a man.”33 So, when nature defines or limits the matter, it does so with view to the 
end or function of that thing. The reason that “nature avoids what is unlimited [ἄπειρον]”34 is pre-
cisely that “what is unlimited is without end, but the end is what nature always seeks.”35 So, for 
instance, the human hand is matter suitably arranged in a definite way with regard to its function, that 
is, grasping; the function of the hand, again, is defined by the function of humans, of which the hand 
is a part.36 The reason that the works of nature are for the most part “ordered and definite” (τεταγμένα 
καὶ ὡρισμένα) is due to fact that their process of development “follows what they are,” and it is “for 
the sake of this essence” that they develop the way they do.37 This is consistent with the claim that 
there is something “natural and fine” in all animals, because “what is not haphazard but rather for the 
sake of something is  in fact present most of all in the works of nature; the end for the sake of which 
each animal has been constituted or comes to be takes the place of the good.”38 
 (iii) This last quote ties the notion of “end” closely with the “good”. But we should note that   
what the translator renders here as the “good” is actually καλός, that is, the “fine”.  This rendering is 
motivated by doing justice to Aristotle’s emphasis on “goodness inherent in the nature of the thing 
valued.”39 This translation also does justice to the close association of καλός in this passage with 
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finality. In fact, “good” (ἀγαθός) is associated as routinely with finality as the “fine”. A horse or 
cithara-player is the better the more it can fulfil the function of horse or cithara player.40 In the hier-
archy of goods, those that are ends, and hence chosen for their own sake, are always better than those 
that are chosen for the sake of a further end; happiness is the highest-good because it has the highest 




2. Why is living something “definite”?  
 
Definiteness confers goodness; but why is living something definite? Most commentators have inter-
preted this claim by reference to Aristotle’s idea that living in the proper sense is an actuality rather 
than merely a potentiality.42 Actuality always defines some of the many potentialities inherent in the 
capacity, and insofar as life is an actuality of perception or thought, as has been established, it is thus 
always something definite. Some interpreters have suggested, in addition, that the definiteness of vital 
activities comes from the fact that each of these activities must have a definite object.43 But the defi-
niteness of activity or of its objects seem to yield too weak a criterion to explain why living is some-
thing definite. One problem is that it does not take into account whether the subject of living is itself 
a definite entity. We have noted above that the notion of definiteness is, as it were, built into the very 
definition of being. Living in the full sense must be the living of a definite living thing, that is, of an 
ensouled matter possessing a definite set of capacities that are by nature arranged in a definite manner 
in view of a specific end. For this reason, we can presume that, say, a life of a man-headed calf is an 
overwhelmingly indefinite life, in spite of the fact that it is an actuality of some sort; for a man-headed 
calf does not exercise, indeed does not have, any characteristic activity of a natural substance. 
 Another problem is that it is difficult to see how this reading fits with the Qualification, that 
is, with the claim that painful or vicious lives are “indefinite”. Assuming that Aristotle uses the word 
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“definite/indefinite” in the same sense in these two closely related contexts, an account of why life in 
general is definite should also be able to explain why certain forms of imperfect lives are indefinite. 
Sarah Broadie attempts to do this when she argues, quite plausibly, that pains “blur” or impede the 
actualizations of vital capacities,44 and hence the life of pain will, on the whole, have a relatively 
lower degree of actualization, and in that sense will be less definite. But one may object that it is not 
at all clear, given the definition of human life as perception or thought, that pain makes us to be less 
fully alive. The very awareness of pain presupposes a kind of perception, so this conclusion is at least 
disputable. This reading will face even greater difficulties when considering the case of vicious life, 
which Broadie does not discuss. It is hard to see why vicious life should generally not consist of 
activities that aim at definite objects, or why it could not actualize the life capacities to the same 
extent that a virtuous life does. In Metaphysics IX.9, Aristotle talks both about a good and a bad 
actuality without suggesting that the bad actuality would be less of an actuality than the good actual-
ity. Bad actuality simply actualizes bad potentialities, and a vicious life actualizes vicious capacities; 
but it does not necessarily actualize them to a lesser degree.   
 But perhaps it is possible to say, after all, that humans living imperfectly fail to actualize, in 
some sense, their distinctively human capacities, and to that extent they fail to be humans in the full 
sense. But then living is definite not because it is an actualization but because it is the actualization 
of the specific vital capacities of some definite thing. Insofar as essence is defined by the end, you 
can, strictly considered, actualize your vital capacities precisely to the extent that you can achieve the 
end. The end of the human life, as Aristotle defines it in the Nicomachean Ethics I.7, is the excellent 
exercise of rational or reason-related capacities of the human soul. And so this is what it means to be 
properly alive qua human. Living is, by definition, an achievement notion. Those who fall short of 
this end fail to actualize their potentialities insofar as they fail to live up to the form that defines the 
human species; and to the extent they fail to live up to it they also fail to live simpliciter, since living 
as a way of existing is an essence-dependent notion. The idea that there are degrees of life, and that 
these degrees of life are strictly coextensive with the degrees of life’s goodness, so that to live more 
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means to live better, and to live better means to live more, seems to be implied in Aristotle’s Protrep-
ticus.45 It is also strongly suggested, prima facie at least, by the Qualification:46 
 
[Living is intrinsically good, because it is definite] but one should not take as example a life 
that is vicious and corrupted [οὐ δεῖ δὲ λαμβάνειν μοχθηρὰν ζωὴν καὶ διεφθαρμένην], or lived 
in pain, since such a life is indefinite [ἀόριστος γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη], as are the attributes that belong 
to it. (The subject of pain, however, will be given clearer treatment in the sequel).  
(EN IX.9, 1170a22-25) 
 
 
The Qualification combines the following three claims: (1) pain, corruption and vice are certain “at-
tributes” (ὑπάρχοντα) of life; (2) these attributes are indefinite and, (3) when they belong to a life 
they make this life indefinite. The (in)definiteness of life depends on the (in)definiteness of its attrib-
utes, that is, on what kind of life it is or how it is lived. Since pain, corruption or vice are indefinite, 
living which is painful, corrupted or vicious, is indefinite as well. And to the extent that the goodness 
of life is conferred by definiteness, these imperfect lives cannot be good.   
 There is useful evidence for the indefiniteness of vice and/or corruption47 in the second book 
of the Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle explicitly links virtue with definiteness and vice with 
indefiniteness.48 This passage fits the conceptual links between definiteness, actuality and end as re-
constructed above. Virtue is a kind of actualization (more precisely: “state,” ἕξις) of the potentialities 
inherent in one’s character brought about by the process of habituation. As the intermediate state of 
character between excess and deficiency, virtue is tightly and narrowly defined by its two limits: the 
excessive and the deficient state. This essence of virtue is defined with regard to its end, that is, to 
“hit upon what is intermediate” in feelings or actions. Given this end, virtue must necessarily be 
precisely the kind of state that it is, that, the intermediate state. Vice, in contrast, is indefinite because 
it can go whichever way. Its indefiniteness means that it does not have its own essence, or that we 
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can define it derivatively as a privation or falling short of virtue. This is why vice does not have its 
own τέλος; it is just a falling short of the τέλος of virtue. 
 As for the indefiniteness of pain, Aristotle announces above that the case of pain “will be 
given clearer treatment in the sequel.” This probably refers to Nicomachean Ethics x.5, where he 
discusses the effect of pain on an activity: pain “destroys” the activity to which it belongs. He does 
not mention the notion of (in)definiteness in that chapter, but we can see on which grounds pain 
would be “indefinite”. Since Aristotle defines pleasure as the unimpeded vital activity of a living 
thing in its natural, uncorrupted state,49 pain must be a falling short of this natural state caused either 
by a corruption of the underlying capacities or by externally induced impediments to their actualiza-
tion. Similarly to vice, pain is thus essentially a privative notion: we can only define pain as the 
deficiency of a certain definite natural state.50 
 Vice and pain make life to which they belong indefinite in the sense that they prevent it from 
completing its function or achieving its end. In order to make one’s life happy, the exercise of reason-
related psychological capacities must satisfy two conditions: it must be “in accordance with excel-
lence”;51 and it must be free from severe impediments.52 Vice and pain seem to frustrate the former 
and the latter condition, respectively: pain impedes the activities and vice corrupts them. Thus, Aris-
totle’s claim that vicious and painful lives are indefinite is consistent with, and follows from, the 
above reconstructed link between definiteness and finality. 
 Whereas the general course of this interpretation seems right, there remains one important 
question. Aristotle presupposes in step (3) above that it is the quality of life’s “attributes” that deter-
mines the quality of life.  But it is not clear how far this determination goes. This depends on whether 
the value of life is exhausted by the value of its accidents or whether life also has something like an 
essential value, so that being alive is in itself something valuable. If the latter is the case, then the 
unhappy lives could still have a grain of intrinsic worth in spite of carrying a considerable deal of 
disvalue. What Aristotle would be saying in the Qualification, then, is not that vicious or painful lives 
are indeterminate tout court, but merely that they are not ideal examples of life being something 
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determinate. In the next section, I discuss some textual evidence in favor of the view that Aristotle 
did attribute some intrinsic value to the mere fact of being alive, independently of its quality. Then, I 
explain how such a view can be justified, that is, why even the bare human life is something definite, 
and hence good. 
 
3. The mere living is worth choosing by itself 
 
There are several passages or remarks scattered in Aristotle’s texts suggesting that living has intrinsic 
worth independently of whether it is good or bad. I start with some implicit hints, and then turn to a 
more explicit passage from the Politics.  
 In the Nicomachean Ethics IX, Aristotle remarks that “existence is worth choosing for every-
one” (τό εἶναι πᾶσιν αἱρετόν),53 that is, presumably, not only for virtuous persons. Another indication 
in the same direction can be found in Aristotle’s discussion of friendship between parents and chil-
dren. In comparing this friendship to the relationship between a king and his subjects, Aristotle notes: 
“Fatherly friendship is also like this, but the scale of the benefits conferred is different; after all, a 
father is responsible for his son’s existence, for which there seems no greater benefit, and for bringing 
him up and educating him”.54 This implies that life has some worth independently of having those 
attributes (such as good education) that are prerequisites for living well. Yet another piece of evidence 
is in Rhetorics I.6, where we find “life” as an item on the list of intrinsic goods: “for even though no 
other good should result from it, it is worth choosing in itself” (καθ’ αὑτὸ αἱρετόν ἐστιν).55 We can 
assume that Aristotle is referring here to the mere living, rather than good living exclusively, since 
the latter option would render the claim that “no other good should result from it” odd: good living is 
the highest good, and hence whether or not another good should result from would be irrelevant.  
 Another implicit piece of evidence comes from Aristotle’s discussion, again in the Ni-
comachean Ethics IX, whether, and in what sense, virtuous person is a self-lover. Aristotle argues 
here that virtuous person will characteristically make certain choices that are informed by how he 
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weighs different goods against each other. “If the need be”, he will even sacrifice his own life “for 
the sake of his friends and his fatherland,” for he would choose (ἕλοιτ᾽ἂν) “a year of a fine life over 
many years of a random life” (βιῶσαι καλῶς ἐνιαυτὸω ἢ πόλλ᾽ ἔτη τυχόντως), since he will always 
allocate to himself the greater good, that is, the “fine”.56 If we parse this as a choice between good 
living and mere living,57 then Aristotle must presuppose that the mere living has at least some intrinsic 
value—otherwise the choice between good living and mere living would be moot. In those situations 
in which life-preservation conflicts with acting finely, the value of mere living will be outweighed by 
the value of a single fine deed done in its place, but the sacrifice of one’s life may still be a genuine 
loss. 
 Perhaps the most explicit and articulate indication in favor of the view that even the mere 
living has some intrinsic worth can be found in Politics III.6. Aristotle claims here that humans join 
political communities not only for the sake of “living well”, but also for the sake of “living by itself”, 
or “mere living”: 
 
 But human beings also join together and maintain political communities for the sake of  
 life by itself [τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν αὐτοῦ]. For there is perhaps [ἴσως] some share of what is fine 
 in the mere living [τι τοῦ καλοῦ μόριον καὶ κατὰ τὸ ζῆν αὐτὸ μόνον], as long as it is not too 
 overburdened with the hardships of life [ἂν μὴ τοῖς χαλεποῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον ὑπερβάλῃ λίαν].
 In any case, it is clear that most human beings are willing to endure much hardship in order 
 to cling to life, as if it had a sort of joy inherent in it and a natural sweetness [ὡς ἐνούσης  
 τινὸς εὐημερίας ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ γλυκύτητος φυσικῆς] (Pol. III.6, 1278b 0-36; transl. according 
 to Reeve, with modifications). 
 
It is striking that Aristotle attributes a share in what is “fine”, that is, the intrinsic value that typically 
characterizes the quality of virtuous actions, to mere living, as explicitly distinguished from good 
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living. Aristotle is somewhat reluctant to grant this (“perhaps”),58 and he makes an important reser-
vation (“unless one’s life is too overburdened with hardships”),59 but it is clear that he means to at-
tribute some intrinsic value also to the mere living, rather than to good living exclusively. It is not 
necessary for life to be happy in order to have a share of the fine; it is sufficient that it is not utterly 
wretched. Along with having a share of the fine, mere living also has qualities that make it worth 
choosing from the subjective perspective of the one who lives it: it has an inherent “joy” and “natural 
sweetness”. This tallies with the above-cited claim from Nicomachean Ethics IX.9 that living is of 
the things that are naturally pleasant. 
 It deserves a special note that the justification of intrinsic value of mere living with reference 
to the “fine” dovetails with the claim from the Nicomachean Ethics that life is good because it is 
definite. There is a well-attested link between the “fine” and the “definite” in Metaphysics XII.3, 
where Aristotle lists the “definite” (ὡρισμένον) as a “kind” (εἶδος) of the “fine”, along with “order” 
(τάξις) and “proportion” (συμμετρία). If definiteness is a kind of the fine, it comes as no surprise that 
Aristotle claims on several occasions that fineness is as characteristic of the workings of nature as is 
their definiteness.60 Insofar as the “definite” is a kind of the “fine”, we can understand the justification 
from the Nicomachean Ethics IX.9 as further explaining or specifying the claim from the Politics: 
mere living has a share of the fine insofar as it has one of its characteristic attributes, namely the 
definite. Whereas in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle does not spell out whether GoL should be read 
restrictively or concessively, in the Politics he is quite explicitly concessive, making clear that the 
intrinsic goodness is to be found even in the mere living.  
 I am ready to acknowledge that whereas this cumulative evidence is quite suggestive, it is not 
entirely conclusive, insofar as several of the above claims are open to an alternative interpretation. 
So, the claim that existence is worth choosing for everyone does not necessarily imply that existence 
is worth choosing for its own sake; for it may be worth choosing for another good that it entails but 
is different from it, such as pleasure. It may be further objected that the claim from the Rhetoric 
belongs to commonly accepted views that Aristotle is collecting in this work, and that it does not 
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necessarily reflect his own philosophical commitments. Finally, the passage from the Politics might 
not have any normative standing; Aristotle might merely be stating the obvious, namely that humans 
tend to choose living, no matter whether they are right to do so.  
 But I do not need to maintain that the above passages must necessarily be read in the way I  
have proposed. Rather, what I wish to maintain is that this is not only a possible reading of these 
passages in their own context, but that it can be further bolstered by showing that Aristotle has an 
implicit theory on the grounds of which he can attribute some intrinsic worth even to unperfected 
human lives. But can Aristotle indeed claim that mere living has a share in the fine or definiteness? 
Given the decisively teleological character of all these notions, this is possible only if we find an 
account on which the mere fact of being alive could be regarded as something definite, complete or 
final quite independently of how well or badly that life is lived. In the next section, I argue that 
Aristotle implicitly presupposes such a rudimentary, excellence-independent level of finality by his 




4. The definition of the human life  
 
Since the unhappy human lives fall short of the human end, they also fall short of definiteness. But 
this does not have to mean that they are as overwhelmingly indefinite as the life of a man-headed 
calf. Indeed, there is indirect but strong evidence that even unhappy human lives are definite to some 
degree. Consider the definition of human life which appears earlier in the same passage:  
Now people define [ὁρίζονται] being alive in the case of animals by capacity for perceiving 
[δυνάμει αἰσθήσεως], and in the case of human beings by capacity for perceiving or thinking 
[αἰσθήσεως ἢ νοήσεως]; but the capacity carries a reference to the activity, and the primary 
 
18 
level is that of the activity; being alive in the full sense [κυρίως] seems [ἔοικε] to be perceiving 
or thinking. (EN IX.9, 1170a16-20) 
The definition of human life in Nicomachean Ethics ix has not received much attention.61 This lack 
of attention may be partly due to Aristotle’s quick dismissal of “living” (ζῆν) as the candidate for the 
human ἔργον in Nicomachean Ethics I. Surely, Aristotle says, living cannot be the distinctively hu-
man activity we are looking for, since even plants live.62 But one should not miss the fact that in the 
context of our passage Aristotle is not talking about life in the most general and minimal sense, that 
is, the activity of the nutritive soul, but specifically about the human life.63 The definition is brief and 
crude, and it is clearly supposed to establish just what Aristotle needs for his argument but there is 
no reason not to take it seriously; after all, it is the only available definition of the human life in 
Aristotle’s ethical works. My plan for this section is as follows: (i) to discuss the relationship between 
this definition and other definitions of human life found in Aristotle’s biological works; (ii) to propose 
that this definition should be read in light of the account of human function in Nicomachean Ethics 
I.7; finally, (iii) to argue that vicious and painful lives fully satisfy this definition, and hence are 
definite.   
 (i) As befits the announced shift to a more naturalistic mode of explanation, the definition of 
the human life in NE ix.9 is largely continuous with the accounts of human psychological capacities 
in Aristotle’s biological works and in De anima. In De Anima III.9, “perception” alongside “thought” 
are those capacities of the animal soul that have to do with “discrimination” (κρίσις), in contrast to 
locomotion or nutrition.64 Insofar as the “faculty of understanding and thought” (τὸ διανοητικόν καὶ 
νοῦς) is distinctive of humans or other rational beings ,65 we can see why Aristotle chooses perception 
and thought as the basic defining attributes of the human life.66 In the biological works, perhaps the 
most useful parallel is the account of scala naturae in the Parts of Animals.67 Whereas plants are alive 
in the minimal sense defined by nutrition and reproduction, animals have, in addition, a capacity for 
perception (αἴσθησις).68 Even more complex are humans, “whose nature partakes not only of living 
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but, in addition, of living well”, since “mankind most of all partakes of the divine”.69 This is a clear 
reference to the activity of thought.70  
 The distinction between “living” and “living well” should give us a pause. Does “living well” 
coincide here with the notions of “living well” or “living finely” from the ethical or political treatises, 
that is, living in accordance with excellence?71 It does not. As argued by Mariska Leunissen, “well” 
in the phrase “living well” typically “indicates a more complex performance of the being’s life func-
tions”, those functions that are not necessary “for the basic survival”.72 Elsewhere Aristotle notes that 
“living well” is not the exclusive preserve of humans, since even animals have higher functions that 
are not necessary for basic survival, and thus partake in “living well”.73 So when Aristotle mentions 
“living well” as something distinctive for humans, he presumably means that humans partake in living 
well in a more substantial or honorable way than animals. But this does not necessarily mean that, in 
order to “live well” in the sense of partaking in rational activities, one also has to “live well” in the 
ethical sense of living “in accordance with excellence.” Rather, it seems that the notion of “living 
well” in the ethical sense falls within the range of “living well” in the biological sense, but has a 
narrower scope: it refers to an excellent exercise of those activities by virtue of which humans can be 
said to live well in the broader sense, that is, perception and thought, and thus be alive qua humans.74 
 (ii) Let me return to the definition of human life in Nicomachean Ethics IX.9. As becomes 
clear few lines later, perceptual activity comprises two levels of psychic life. There is a first-order 
perceiving or thinking, and there is also a second-order perception or awareness (αἴσθησις or 
συναίσθησις) of these first-order activities: perceiving that one sees, perceiving that one hears, per-
ceiving that one walks, perceiving that one thinks etc.75 While Aristotle does not state this explicitly, 
the way he describes these activities suggests that the definition of the human life refers equally to 
activities at both levels, and that the first-order activities are typically accompanied by second-order 
perceptions of these activities. We are alive insofar as we think or perceive, but also insofar as we are 
aware of these activities. Is this second-order perception distinctively unique for human life, in con-
trast to animal life? When Aristotle discusses second-order perception in De Anima III.2, he seems 
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to understand it as an attribute that belongs to perception in general, rather than what would be dis-
tinctive for human perception alone. Likewise, in the present passage second-order perception plays 
a crucial role in Aristotle’s argument that friends are necessary for happiness, but it does not make 
the difference between human and animal life.  
 So, presumably, what is distinctive for the human life must be found already on the first-order 
level of psychic activity. For this reason, several commentators76 have proposed that instead of “per-
ceiving or thinking” the text should read “perceiving and [καὶ] thinking”—as it appears in the parallel 
version of this definition in Eudemian Ethics77—since the capacity for perception is shared by humans 
and animals. One so-far overlooked consideration in favor of sticking to the text is that the phrase 
“perceiving or thinking” could well reflect Aristotle’s definition of human function as the “activity 
of the soul in accordance with reason, or not apart from reason” (ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον ἢ μὴ 
ἄνευ λόγου).78 These two kinds of activity refer, according to a well-established reading, to two dif-
ferent parts of the soul: a strictly rational part which possesses reason, and a non-rational but reason-
responsive part.79 When Aristotle defines human life in terms of perception or thought, he could have 
in mind these two kinds of activities. For it is the strictly rational part which thinks, and the non-
rational (but reason-responsive) part which perceives.80 Neither in Nicomachean Ethics I.7 nor in 
Nicomachean Ethics IX.9 does this amount to a concession that even a merely perceptual life, or life 
devoid of any rational activity proper, could qualify as human, but rather that the characteristically 
human activities are of two different kinds, owing to the peculiar composition of the human soul. 
Moreover, given this composition, even the purely perceptual activities of the human soul, or at least 
some of them, may be qualitatively different from the perceptual activities of non-rational animals, 
insofar as they are transformed by the cohabitation with the rational part of the soul.81  
 (iii) Vice or pain will would make life indefinite tout court if they prevent it from being a life 
of perception or thought in the sense just specified. If they do not cause this deprivation, then they 
will make a life to which they belong fall short of happiness, but not of the level of definiteness that 
derives from the fact that it is a recognizably human life. I limit the discussion here to the more 
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conclusive case of vice.82 There is an obvious reason why vice does not touch the rudimentary defi-
niteness of life, namely that vicious activity is in fact possible only within the characteristically and 
distinctly human modus operandi; it presupposes the exercise of rational capacities.83 The clearest 
indication for this is that vicious actions, just like virtuous actions, spring from “decision” or “rational 
choice” (προαίρεσις). In contrast to virtuous and self-controlled persons, who make good choices and 
act on them, and in contrast to akratic persons who make good choices but fail to act on them, vicious 
persons make bad choices, because vice “corrupts” (διαφθείρει) the “starting-points” (ἀρχαί) of their 
practical reasoning,84 so that their practical reasoning rests on a wrong conception of the end of hu-
man action. Nonetheless, even these defective decisions are decisions in the full sense, insofar as the 
procedure that results in them is rational, including both rational desire and practical thought. “Deci-
sion is not possible without understanding and thought (ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ διανοίας)”;85 it is not only acting 
well that requires thought, but also acting badly (εὐπραξία καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον).86  
 In order to appreciate the extent to which vice presupposes rationality, it is perhaps useful to 
compare it with the state of “brutishness” (θηριότης). In Nicomachean Ethics vii.1, Aristotle distin-
guishes three defective conditions of character: lack of self-control (ἀκρασία), vice (κακία) and brut-
ishness. Just as there is a superhuman condition that exceeds virtue, embodied by heroes like Priam, 
there is a sub-human condition that exceeds vice, namely brutishness. This is a condition that is 
caused by an originally bad nature (φύσις μοχθερά), disease or bad habits,87 and psychologically 
characterized, in particular, by taking pleasure in things that are not pleasant “by nature”.88 Aristotle 
offers a fairly heterogenous catalogue of brutish states: ripping open pregnant women and devouring 
the infants; homosexuality; fearing the squeak of a mouse.89 What is important in the context of our 
argument is that he sharply distinguishes brutishness from vice: it is a “different kind of state from 
vice (ἕτερόν τι γένος κακίας).”90 One important reason for this distinction is that Aristotle associates 
at least some kinds of brutish conditions with the absence of rationality: “and of mindless people 
those who by nature are lacking in reasoning powers and live by their senses alone are brutish.”91 
This agrees with his remark later on that brutishness is more alarming than vice: “for it is not that the 
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better part (τὸ βέλτιον)92 has been perverted, as in man—they have no better part.”93 In contrast to 
vice, which is a corruption of reason, brutishness is a lack of it. Whereas you cannot be brutish qua 
human, insofar brutishness makes that life fundamentally indefinite, you can only live viciously qua 
human; and hence the vicious life must be definite.  
 
5. Unhappy human lives as “mere” exercises of the human function 
I have argued so far that even though vice and pain deprive human life of happiness, they do not in 
the least detract from its status of a definitely human life. This interpretation presupposes that human 
life can achieve two different levels of finality that correspond to two different normative domains: 
the rudimentary finality and the advanced finality.  The advanced finality amounts to the highest end 
of human life, that is, happiness. The rudimentary finality amounts to a life that satisfies the definition 
of the human life. The advanced finality presupposes the rudimentary finality; but the rudimentary 
finality can be achieved independently of the advanced finality: it is possible to live a definite human 
life without necessarily living it well. The goodness that derives from how well the life is lived is, as 
it were, only an accidental—rather than an essential—attribute of the recognizably human life. If life 
is excellent, then this excellence adds a significant goodness to its rudimentary goodness; if life lacks 
excellence, then the overall goodness of life is exhausted by its rudimentary goodness. Whether life 
is lived well or badly makes a significant difference to the overall goodness of life, but it does not 
increase or diminish its rudimentary goodness grounded in the rudimentary finality.  
 We can note that the this distinction between two levels of finality is already implied in the 
definition of the human life. Since definition is the account of essence, and essence is defined with 
reference to function, this definition entails an implicit account of the human function. Insofar as this 
function does not make any reference to excellence, it must be broader than the account of the highest 
human end in Nicomachean Ethics I.7. Even when your life is vicious, you do live a fully and recog-
nizably human life, because you exercise the characteristic human function. But, of course, you still 
fall short of exercising the human function in the specific sense of exercising it “in accordance with 
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excellence”, or in a manner that constitutes happiness. This implies that it is possible to exercise the 
human function imperfectly, perhaps even badly, without diminishing the fact that the function being 
exercised remains the distinctively human function.   
 Whereas Aristotle’s account of human function in NE i.7 focuses, as befits the broader context 
of the discussion, on the advanced finality of the human life, it certainly does not exclude the possi-
bility of the rudimentary level of finality. In fact, we can find, there and elsewhere, indications in 
favor of this distinction. In Aristotle’s discussion of practical wisdom in the Nicomachean Ethics 
VI.12, he notes that “our function is fulfilled [ἔργον ἀποτελεῖται] insofar as we have practical wisdom 
and virtue of character; for virtue makes the goal correct and practical wisdom makes the things 
promoting the goal [correct].”94  When translating ἀποτελεῖται as “is fulfilled” or “is achieved” 
(Crisp), this suggests that without practical wisdom we cannot exercise our function at all. But 
ἀποτελεῖται connotes perfection; practical wisdom is necessary to fulfil our function perfectly or 
completely, but not to fulfil it at a more rudimentary level. This is confirmed by another occurrence 
of the same phrase, ἔργον ἀποτελεῖν, in Nicomachean Ethics II.6: excellence is what makes a thing 
able to “perfectly fulfil” (ἀποτελεῖ) its function, so that, for instance, it is “through the excellence of 
the eye that we see well”. This passage implies a clear contrast between exercising function in a 
minimal, rudimentary sense and exercising it well. 
 Τhis distinction is even more explicit in Aristotle’s analogy between the function of practi-
tioners of arts and the human function in Nicomachean Ethics I.7: 
 
If the function of a human being is the activity of the soul in accordance with reason, or not 
apart from reason, and the function, we say, of a given sort of practitioner and a good practi-
tioner of that sort is generically the same [τὸ δ᾽ αὐτό φαμεν ἔργον εἶναι τῷ γένει τοῦδε καὶ 
τοῦδε σπουδαίου], as for example in the case of a cithara-player and a good cithara-player, 
and this is so without qualification in all cases, where a difference in respect of excellence is 
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added to the function [προστιθεμένης τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὑπεροχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἔργον], then … 
(EN I.7, 1098a 8-12) 
Note that the function of a human being or of a cithara-player is at first defined without reference to 
excellence. Both a cithara-player and a good cithara-player play cithara, and thus exercise their ἐργον 
of cithara-players. Their activity is identical, insofar as it belongs to the same genus. The excellence 
of the good player’s play does not make it an activity of a different kind; rather, the excellence is an 
addition to the bare exercise of function. This indicates that, in order to fulfil one’s function in a 
rudimentary sense, the exercise of that function does not necessarily have to be impeccable. Even a 
poor cithara-player exercises her function, insofar as she meets certain basic conditions that define 
what cithara playing is, which is why she can justly be called a cithara-player. This is consistent with 
Aristotle’s careful formulation that the human good “resides in the function” (ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ),95 rather 
than that it is identical with the function.   
 A potentially disquieting consequence of this view is the extent to which it allows to divorce 
rationality from excellence. As Sarah Broadie has put it: if “a bad man who pursues wrong ends may 
be just as rational in his pursuit of them: just as logical, intelligent, sound in his calculations and grasp 
of empirical facts”, then it is difficult to see how can one become better on account of becoming more 
rational.96 A possible response to this worry, floated by Christine Korsgaard, is that Aristotle is using 
the notion of rationality in two different senses, descriptive and normative. Making a bad rational 
decision is clearly a rational failure, but this is a failure of rationality in the normative sense; as for 
the very fact of having made that decision, this is an achievement of the rationality in the descriptive 
sense. According to Korsgaard, Aristotle is “clearly” using rationality in the descriptive sense, rather 
than the normative, in his account of human function.97 Given that Aristotle himself never draws this 
distinction, though, we perhaps should not be too confident of this. But the distinction seems to map 
quite well on our distinction between the rudimentary finality, defined by what humans do by nature, 
and the advanced finality, defined by what they do when their nature is perfected by the art of politics. 
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 But if the level of finality that constitutes the goodness of mere living is merely descriptive, 
rather than normative, then we are confronted with the question whether this kind of goodness can 
ever have any normative or practical relevance. What does it matter, for the purposes of practical 
deliberation, that my living is good in the abstract sense of fitting a definite box in the natural teleol-
ogy? In what sense can this life be choiceworthy or good for me, if it is lived badly? Or, perhaps, is 
it practically relevant in the sense that I ought to choose it? The question about the practical relevance 
of the rudimentary goodness of life questions is exacerbated by Aristotle’s remarks mentioned in the 
introduction that at least some imperfect forms of lives would better not be lived at all.  If the rudi-
mentary goodness matters, should these lives not be worth choosing in spite of their imperfection?  
6. The practical relevance of the goodness of mere living 
 
The first point to make is that Aristotle’s pessimistic remarks about the value of unhappy lives do not 
necessarily entail that mere living cannot have any intrinsic value at all. In fact, the claim that the 
vicious life does not deserve to be lived can be plausibly understood as an all-things-considered judg-
ment that results from weighing the intrinsic goodness of mere living against the badness that this life 
has on account of being lived badly. The conclusion is that the badness conferred by vice outweighs 
the rudimentary goodness of life, but not that it cancels it or indeed diminishes it. Vicious lives are, 
on the whole, not worth choosing, but that does not mean that they are void of value altogether: they 
do have a grain of goodness, which amounts to the excellence- and vice-independent rudimentary 
goodness of life. Moreover, it is still possible, at least in principle, that the rudimentary goodness 
could make a real difference in less clear-cut cases, such as half-virtuous or half-vicious (ἡμιπόνηρος) 
lives,98 or virtuous but painful lives. In these cases, where the badness of life is not as overwhelming, 
the rudimentary goodness of mere living could possibly tip the balance in favor of living rather than 
not living, should such choices be made. 
 It is also easily possible to find a place for the rudimentary goodness in Aristotle’s classifica-
tion of goods. When Aristotle says in Nicomachean Ethics IX.8 that the virtuous person will in some 
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situations sacrifice wealth, honors and life, he seems to understand the value of mere living in the 
broad category of the so-called “middle-level ends”, such as honor or pleasure, that is, those that we 
choose “both for their own sake and for the sake of something else,” or that we choose even if “noth-
ing resulted from them.” 99 Living is chosen for the sake of happiness, insofar as one can only live 
well as long as one is alive. At the same time, it is also something we pursue and keep for its own 
sake, as stated explicitly in the passage from Rhetorics cited above. As befits the status of middle-
level ends, life should be abandoned in cases when it conflicts with happiness.  
 But it still remains to be seen in what sense the rudimentary goodness of life make life an 
attractive or compelling object of choice. Aristotle does not offer a clear answer to this question, but 
in the remaining part of this section I try to reconstruct, to some extent speculatively, what his answer 
could look like. It might be useful at this point to turn briefly to the views about the value of mere 
human living that we find later in Stoicism, since the Stoics were far more explicit than Aristotle 
about the value of mere living and what makes it a compelling object of choice. For the Stoics, the 
value of mere living is sharply distinguished from the value of good living; whereas the former is 
good in the full sense, mere living is merely a preferred indifferent: having more of life won’t make 
us more happy, but, unless it makes us unhappy, we are justified in choosing it.100 This value of mere 
living derives from the fact that life is something natural. For the Stoics, nature is a normative, prov-
idential force that creates and orders everything in the best possible, namely the rational way, for the 
sake of the whole universe. So the fact that being alive qua human is something natural means that it 
is something that might be even appropriate for us to do. Being a human, or living a human life, 
perhaps even a vicious life, is a role we have to play, like actors, as our contribution to the providential 
ordering of the cosmos.101 Exiting life without good reasons amounts to shirking the role that we were 
assigned by the rational God. 
 It seems that Aristotle’s justification of the choiceworthiness of life is based, like in Stoicism, 
on conceiving the human life as a work of nature. In contrast to the Stoics, however, Aristotle did not 
understand the choiceworthiness of life in terms of a duty or appropriate action.  We do not find any 
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parallels in his thoughts to the Stoic view that humans are determined by the god to play a certain 
specific cosmic role, and that we therefore ought to choose to stay alive in most circumstances. Ra-
ther, the view that the human life is something natural could make this life choiceworthy in more 
characteristically Aristotelian terms, namely as a source of pleasure. We have seen that both in the 
Nicomachean Ethics and in the Politics, Aristotle links the intrinsic goodness of life closely with its 
pleasantness. Even the mere living has some “natural sweetness”, which no doubt reflects the fact 
that life is “naturally good”. Since, as we said, Aristotle defines pleasure as “an unimpeded activity 
of natural state”, and since living qua human is an activity of a natural state, then even the mere 
human living is bound to be pleasant. So perhaps we can think of the pleasure of being alive as a 
corollary, and manifestation, of life’s rudimentary, natural goodness, and something that makes the 
mere living good for us. 
 But when we think about two main kinds of unhappy life, namely painful and vicious life, one 
may worry whether, or in what sense, these lives can really count as natural and pleasant. Here I can 
offer nothing but a plausible speculation remotely based on Aristotle’s texts. Firstly, how can the life 
of pain be pleasant? The answer is that it can be pleasant in the similar sense that a bad life can be 
good: by virtue of its attribute, namely painfulness, it is painful; but by virtue of being a life, it is 
pleasant. Since the human life is defined by thought or perception, this has to mean that one’s per-
ception can be a source of pleasure even when it is perception of pain. This is possible if we grant 
that one can be pleased by the fact that one perceives independently of what one perceives. This 
thought could perhaps be further bolstered by drawing on Aristotle’s distinction between two orders 
of perception from his definition of the human life, so that the pleasure in the very activity of percep-
tion would be assigned to the higher order of perceiving that we perceive. This line of explanation is 
in principle also applicable to the case of vicious life. Vicious life will typically contain a great deal 
of vicious pleasure, that is, pleasure in vicious activities. But it is likely that not all of this life’s 
activities, including those that involve reason, such as action un-related activities of theoretical 
thought, will be vicious. More importantly, though, even the vicious activities may be a source of 
 
28 
natural pleasure precisely insofar as they presuppose the actualisation of vital capacities that define 
the human species. corresponding activities are natural.102  
 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
I have proposed that the concessive reading of the GoL claim can be squared with Aristotle’s perva-
sive teleological commitments in metaphysics and ethics. The mere human living is intrinsically good 
because it constitutes a definite level of finality, the rudimentary finality, that can be achieved inde-
pendently of life’s excellence. I conclude by revisiting the brief remarks made in the introduction 
about the relationship between Aristotle’s natural science and his ethics. What implications does the 
distinction between the rudimentary and the advanced finality have for our understanding of the re-
lationship between the scientific/biological, and normative/ethical domains of Aristotle’s philoso-
phy? One possible conclusion is that the distinction between two levels of finality speaks in favour 
of a sharp separation between the two domains. Insofar as it is possible to arrive at a full definition 
of the human species without referring to the human good, then the level of rudimentary finality 
corresponds to the purely biological perspective on humanity. This biological discourse does not have 
to wait on the ethical discussion to conclude its investigations. The ethical discourse with its advanced 
finality introduces normative considerations that are absent from the purely biological level of rudi-
mentary finality.  
 There are two reasons why this conclusion should be resisted. One is that the biological per-
spective clearly extends all the way up to the normative domain of political and ethical treatises.  The 
Politics can be regarded as a biological work in an extended sense, since humans are defined in the 
first chapter of the work as “political animals” and every polis is said to exist by nature. When it 
comes to the ethical theory, it has been claimed with a considerable plausibility that “biological facts 
about what it is to be a human being inform Aristotle’s normative claims about the human good.”103 
We can add that the account of the human good can be regarded, in turn, as the culmination of the 
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biological discourse about humans, insofar as it is by living in accordance with excellence that hu-
mans achieve their perfection qua members of their respective biological species. In other words, the 
biological perspective on humans cannot be reduced to the level of the rudimentary finality.  
 But there is also another reason against the sharp separation of biological and ethical perspec-
tive, namely that the normative domain extends all the way down to the realm of biology. If our 
interpretation is right, that the biological facts about what it is to be a human not only inform Aristo-
tle’s normative claims but themselves already have some normative standing. Aristotle nowhere sug-
gests that we should sharply distinguish between a biological and an ethical definiteness, and hence 
exclude the rudimentary goodness from the ethical domain. So, rather than strictly assigning the ru-
dimentary finality to the domain of biology, and the advanced finality to the domain of ethics, it might 
be more appropriate to talk about the distinction between a higher and a lower level of biological-
cum-ethical goodness. Just as we become fully biologically perfect only when we become virtuous, 
so our life already has some rudimentary degree of goodness as soon as it conforms to the biological 
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